

## Environmental Institutions

ESM 248, Winter 2019

Professor: Mark Buntaine ([buntaine@bren.ucsb.edu](mailto:buntaine@bren.ucsb.edu))

Class meeting: Monday / Wednesday 2 - 3:15 (Bren 1424)

Office hours: Flexible, email to schedule (Bren 4422)

**No Class Meetings: M 1/7, W 1/9, M 1/14**

**Make-Up Class Meetings: F 1/18, F 2/1, F 3/1**

**Final Mini-Conference: M 3/18 4-7pm (scheduled exam period) or TBD**

### Course Summary

Institutions are rules, both formal and informal, that shape interactions between individuals, groups, and organizations. Because institutions exist in a vast array of forms at many different levels, they affect nearly every aspect of environmental management. This course provides tools that can be used to analyze informal, local, national, and international institutions. By recognizing the myriad of rules that affect the design, implementation, and effectiveness of environmental management activities, you will be equipped to anticipate successful strategies to address environmental problems in many settings.

Critical to all types of institutional analysis are the concepts of *rule-making*, *enforcement*, and *monitoring*. Institutions such as national constitutions, cultural practices, or organizational procedures shape how rules are made. For any rule to affect behavior, some entity must be willing to impose costs for non-compliance or provide benefits for compliance. Mechanisms of enforcement include social pressures, market demand, legal sanctions, and reputation. To be able to enforce rules, information about compliance must be available. Monitoring produces this information and comes about through dense social relationships, government audits, private certification schemes, and voluntary reporting requirements, among many other possibilities. Institutional analysis seeks to diagnose the ways that behaviors can be shifted in desirable directions through rule-making, monitoring, and enforcement strategies. As we will see, environmental policies and management activities are seldom effective if they are not nested within supporting institutions.

### Course Goals

- Analyze how formal and informal institutions affect individual and organizational behaviors in a variety of settings;
- Explore innovations in rule-making, enforcement, and monitoring, and their effects on environmental management;
- Assess the opportunities for institution building and reform at the community, domestic and global levels;
- Complete professional tasks that use institutional analysis;
- Develop professional communication skills related to institutional analysis;

## Evaluation

Mini-Projects: The main goal of this course is to use institutional analysis to complete tasks found in professional settings. As such, the course is built around four mini-projects, which will be outlined in separate documents. For each of the mini-projects, you are encouraged to collaborate with up to two classmates. You may only collaborate with any single person **one** time over the four mini-projects. Everyone in a group must take full ownership of the final project and will receive the same grade, since I have no way to distinguish individual contributions.

Participation: Your active participation is important for the success of this course. Unlike a traditional lecture course evaluated by exams, sessions have been designed to build skills through active participation, discussion, and activities. I expect that you will closely read all of the assigned articles and/or documents before coming to class and that you will be prepared to engage in all discussions and activities. In addition, you will be required to prepare professional presentations for some mini-projects, the quality of which will factor into both your participation and assignment grades. You are expected to attend all course sessions. Talk to me beforehand if you need to miss class for a legitimate reason, otherwise absences will negatively affect your participation grade.

Mini-Project #1 (Institutional profile, due: <b>Tuesday 1/29 @ 5pm</b> )	20%
Mini-Project #2 (Institutional response, due: <b>Friday 2/16 @ 5pm</b> )	20%
Mini-Project #3 (Monitoring brief, due: <b>Tuesday 3/5 @ 5pm</b> )	20%
Mini-Project #4 (Institutional proposal, due: <b>Friday 3/23 @ 5pm</b> )	20%
Participation	20%

Assignment completion policy: You must complete all assignments to pass the course.

Re-grades: I take student evaluation seriously and do not entertain requests to re-grade assignments unless I receive a formal, written request for a re-grade that compellingly documents a serious oversight on my part. A serious oversight on my part indicates that the entire assignment should receive further attention. Your score may go up or down if I decide that an assignment needs this kind of attention, so plan accordingly. That being said, I strongly encourage you to meet with me to discuss the substance of my comments about your mini-projects.

Academic Honesty: I expect you to adhere to the highest standards of academic honesty. This means only turning in work that is your own and properly citing all information and ideas that you draw from others. Any assignment that does not adhere to UCSB academic honesty guidelines will not receive credit and will be referred to campus judicial procedures. See the linked [guidelines](#).

Key for types of class sessions: **D**iscussion, **L**ecture, **A**ctivity, **P**resentations

## **Unit 1: Institutional Forms and Features**

### **Session 1 (W 1/16) – Institutional roots of environmental problems (D)**

North, *Institutions, Institutional Change, and Economic Performance*, Ch. 1

Sjöstedt, M., & Sundström, A. (2015). Coping with illegal fishing: An institutional account of success and failure in Namibia and South Africa. *Biological Conservation*, 189: 78-85.

Discussion: Come prepared to describe an environmental problem that you care about and one reason why that the problem has not been solved.

### **Session 2 (F 1/18) – Types of institutions (L)**

Ostrom, *Governing the Commons*, Ch. 2

Osei-Tutu, P. (2017). Taboos as informal institutions of local resource management in Ghana: Why they are complied with or not. *Forest Policy and Economics*, 85, 114-123.

**NO CLASS, M 1/21, Martin Luther King Jr. Day**

### **Session 3 (W 1/23) – Institutional profile (A)**

Examples of institutional profiles, recommended reading:

Richmond, L. & Levine, A. (2012). Institutional analysis of community-based marine resource management initiatives in Hawai'i and American Samoa. Pacific Islands Fisheries Science Center. NOAA Technical Memorandum NMFS-PIFSC-35.

Suhardiman, D., de Silva, S. & Carew-Reid, J. (2011). Policy review and institutional analysis of the hydropower sector in Lao PDR, Cambodia, and Vietnam. International Water Management Institute.

*Mini-project #1 (Institutional Profile): identify the institutional features that affect the current status of an environmental resource of your choice and submit a 4-5 page institutional profile.*

**Due Tuesday 1/29 @ 5pm.**

## **Unit 2: Rule-Making**

### **Session 4 (M 1/28) – Self-organized institutions (L/D), Matt Potoski**

Ostrom, *Governing the Commons*, Ch. 6.

Basurto, X. (2005). How locally designed access and use controls can prevent the tragedy of the commons in a Mexican small-scale fishing community. *Society and Natural Resources*, 18(7), 643-659.

### **Session 5 (W 1/30) – Governments as rule-making institutions (L/A), Sarah Anderson**

Tsebelis, G. (1995). Decision making in political systems: Veto players in presidentialism, parliamentarism, multicameralism and multipartism. *British Journal of Political Science*, 25(3), 289-325.

Cooper, J., Kim, S. E., & Urpelainen, J. (2018). The Broad Impact of a Narrow Conflict: How Natural Resource Windfalls Shape Policy and Politics. *Journal of Politics*, 80(2), 630-646.

Activity: In groups, identify the advantages, disadvantages, and challenges of working through governmental legislation as a way of address the assigned environmental problem. Bring laptops.

### **Session 6 (F 2/1) – Participation and rule-making (A)**

Irvin, R. A., & Stansbury, J. (2004). Citizen participation in decision making: is it worth the effort? *Public Administration Review*, 64(1), 55-65.

López-Bao, J. V., Chapron, G., & Treves, A. (2017). The Achilles heel of participatory conservation. *Biological Conservation*, 212, 139-143.

Activity: Participatory decision-making simulation. Details will be posted on GauchoSpace.

### **Session 7 (M 2/4) — Inequities in rule-making**

Kalla, J. L., & Broockman, D. E. (2016). Campaign contributions facilitate access to congressional officials: A randomized field experiment. *American Journal of Political Science*, 60(3), 545-558.

Daley, D. M., & Reames, T. G. (2015). Public Participation and Environmental Justice: Access to Federal Decision Making. In *Failed Promises: Evaluating the Federal Government's Response to Environmental Justice*, D. Konisky, Ed. pp. 143-172.

### **Unit 3: Enforcement**

#### **Session 8 (W 2/6) – Strategy of enforcement (D/L)**

Robinson, E. J., Kumar, A. M., & Albers, H. J. (2010). Protecting developing countries' forests: enforcement in theory and practice. *Journal of Natural Resources Policy Research*, 2(1), 25-38.

Shimshack, J. P., & Ward, M. B. (2005). Regulator reputation, enforcement, and environmental compliance. *Journal of Environmental Economics and Management*, 50(3), 519-540.

#### **Suggested extra reading:**

Environmental Protection Agency. (2016). National Enforcement Initiatives. Available at: <https://www.epa.gov/enforcement/national-enforcement-initiatives>

#### **Session 9 (M 2/11) – Market-based enforcement (D)**

Magali Delmas and Laura Grant. (2014). Eco-Labeling Strategies and Price-Premium: The Wine Industry Puzzle. *Business & Society* 53(1): 6-44.

Lyon, T. P., & Shimshack, J. P. (2015). Environmental disclosure: Evidence from Newsweek's green companies rankings. *Business & Society*, 54(5), 632-675.

*Mini-project #2 (Institutional Response): Analysis of an Eco-Label from the perspective of a firm or an NGO. Write a 3-4 page strategic assessment about how the firm or NGO should behave with respect to the Eco-Label based on the institutions it establishes. **Due Friday 2/16 @ 5pm.***

#### **Session 10 (W 2/13) – Legal enforcement (L)**

U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (1984). *Policy on Civil Penalties*. Available at: <https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/documents/epapolicy-civilpenalties021684.pdf>

Sundström, A. (2012). Corruption and regulatory compliance: Experimental findings from South African small-scale fisheries. *Marine Policy*, 36(6), 1255-1264.

## **NO CLASS, M 2/18, President's Day**

### **Session 11 (W 2/20) – Social enforcement (D)**

Griskevicius, V., Tybur, J. M., & Van den Bergh, B. (2010). Going green to be seen: status, reputation, and conspicuous conservation. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 98(3), 392-404.

Allcott, H., & Rogers, T. (2014). The short-run and long-run effects of behavioral interventions: Experimental evidence from energy conservation. *American Economic Review*, 104(10), 3003-3037.

### **Unit 4: Monitoring**

#### **Session 12 (M 2/25) – Strategy of Monitoring Compliance (L)**

Zou, E. (2018). Unwatched Pollution: The Effect of Intermittent Monitoring on Air Quality. *Working Paper*.

Guerrero, S., & Innes, R. (2011). Self-policing statutes: do they reduce pollution and save regulatory costs? *Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization*, 29(3), 608-637.

Read in detail about **one** EPA compliance monitoring program:

<https://www.epa.gov/compliance/compliance-monitoring-programs>

#### **Session 13 (W 2/27) – Citizen Monitoring (L)**

Buntaine, M. T. (2015). Accountability in global governance: civil society claims for environmental performance at the World Bank. *International Studies Quarterly*, 59(1), 99-111.

Buntaine, M., Hunnicutt, P., & Komakech, P. (2018). The Challenges of Using Citizen Reporting to Improve Public Services: A Field Experiment and Framework. Available at: [https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract\\_id=3299044](https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3299044).

## Session 14 (F 3/1) – Innovations in Monitoring (Poster Session)

Background reading for some ideas:

INECE. 2015. *Special Report on Next Generation Compliance*. Available at:  
[https://inece.org/assets/Publications/5748af16cf1d4\\_SpecialReportOnNextGenerationCompliance\\_Full.pdf](https://inece.org/assets/Publications/5748af16cf1d4_SpecialReportOnNextGenerationCompliance_Full.pdf)

Lynch, J., Maslin, M., Balzter, H., & Sweeting, M. (2013). Sustainability: Choose satellites to monitor deforestation. *Nature*, 496(7445), 293-294.

See also:

<http://www.miningweekly.com/article/mines-ministry-hails-indias-satellite-based-illegal-mining-monitoring-a-success-2017-05-25>

Assunção, J., Gandour, C., & Rocha, R. (2017). DETERring Deforestation in the Brazilian Amazon: Environmental Monitoring and Law Enforcement. *Climate Policy Initiative Report, PUC-Rio*, Available at:  
[https://climatepolicyinitiative.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/05/DETERring-Deforestation-in-the-Brazilian-Amazon-Environmental-Monitoring-and-Law-Enforcement-Technical-Paper\\_Feb2017.pdf](https://climatepolicyinitiative.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/05/DETERring-Deforestation-in-the-Brazilian-Amazon-Environmental-Monitoring-and-Law-Enforcement-Technical-Paper_Feb2017.pdf)

Mulero-Pázmány, M., Stolper, R., Van Essen, L. D., Negro, J. J., & Sassen, T. (2014). Remotely piloted aircraft systems as a rhinoceros anti-poaching tool in Africa. *PloS one*, 9(1), e83873.

Stokstad, E. (2014). Will fracking put too much fizz in your water? *Science*, 344(6191), 1468-1471.

*Mini-project #3 (Monitoring Brief):* Write a 2-page memo to a policy-maker of interest suggesting ways to improve monitoring of an environmental problem.

**Due Tuesday 3/5 @ 5pm.**

## Unit 5. Building Institutions

### Session 15 (M 3/4) – Institutional Failures (L/A)

Buntaine, M. T., Daniels, B., & Devlin, C. (2017). Can information outreach increase participation in community-driven development? A field experiment near Bwindi National Park, Uganda. *World Development*, forthcoming.

Bloomfield, M. J., & Schleifer, P. (2017). Tracing Failure of Coral Reef Protection in Nonstate Market-Driven Governance. *Global Environmental Politics*, 17(4), 127-146.

### **Session 16 (W 3/6) – Institutional Change (D)**

Roland, G. (2004). Understanding institutional change: fast-moving and slow-moving institutions. *Studies in Comparative International Development*, 38(4), 109-131.

Young, O.R. (2010). Institutional dynamics: Resilience, vulnerability and adaptation in environmental and resource regimes. *Global Environmental Change* 20(3): 378–385.

### **Session 17 (M 3/11) – Development assistance and government reform (L)**

Buntaine, M. T., Parks, B. C., & Buch, B. P. (2017). Aiming at the Wrong Targets: The Domestic Consequences of International Efforts to Build Institutions. *International Studies Quarterly*, 61(2), 471-488.

Eltz, M., Narain, U., Orfie, A., & Schneider, R. (2010). *Strengthening Environmental Institutions and Governance: What Should be the Role of the World Bank Group?* (Analytical Report No. 12756). The World Bank.

### **Session 18 (W 3/13) – Global institutions (L)**

Ostrom, Elinor, and et al. (1999). Revisiting the commons: local lessons, global challenges. *Science* 284 (5412): 278-282.

Rosen, A. M. (2015). The wrong solution at the right time: The failure of the Kyoto Protocol on climate change. *Politics & Policy*, 43(1), 30-58.

### **Special Mini-Conference: Final Presentations**

*Mini-Project #4: Create a 4-5 page proposal for building and/or reforming an institution to manage an environmental problem. Address rule-making, monitoring, and enforcement, including trade-offs between these components of institution building. **Due Friday 3/22 @ 5pm.***